Four Essays in Labor Economics and Microeconometrics: Dissertation Summary by Hu, Luojia
Dissertation Awards 
1-1-2000 




Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/dissertation_awards 
Four Essays in Labor Economics 
and Microeconometrics 
Luojia Hu 
This disseliation comprises four essays in labor 
economics and microeconometrics. In particular, I am 
concerned with three issues: firms' hiring decisions and 
compensation stmctures; immigration and welfare; and 
eamings dynamics. I also propose new econometric 
methods for the empirical analyses. 
Chapter 1 
Who Gets Good Jobs? 
The Hiring Decisions and Compensation 
Structures of Large Firms 
It is a stylized fact that large firms pay higher wages 
than small firms. Most research in labor economics 
conceming firm size has focused on this size/wage 
puzzle, but little attention has been paid to the 
differences in hiring practices and wage structures 
between large and small firms, which are the issues this 
chapter focuses on. 
The firm-specific human capital theory implies that 
large firms prefer to hire younger workers because they 
invest more in workers than small firms do and because 
those investments are fixed costs. In this paper, I use 
data from the Benefits Supplement to the CUlTent 
Population Survey (CPS) to demonstrate that large 
firms indeed hire younger workers than small firms, 
especially for white-collar occupations. I present a 
simple model of firm cost minimization within an 
employee search framework, which is consistent with 
large firms' propensity to hire younger workers and has 
additional testable implications regarding large firms' 
compensation structures. First, because young workers 
are more valuable to large firms than to small firms, 
large firms offer higher starting wages to attract them, 
which implies flatter starting wage/age profiles among 
the n~w hires in large firms than in small firms. Second, 
because large firms invest more in workers, they 
continue to pay higher wages to retain the trained 
employees; this implies steeper wage/tenure profiles in 
large firms. Both predictions are borne out by the CPS 
data. Most strikingly, for the newly hired white-collar 
workers, not only are the starting wage/age profiles 
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flatter in large firms, but also the size/wage premium 
disappears for workers hired at age 35 or older. 
Furthennore, by exploiting cost variations in 
dimensions other than firm size, such as occupation and 
industry, this model has additional testable 
implications. More specifically, an extension of the 
simple model would imply that, for high training 
occupations, workers displaced at older ages suffer 
greater wage losses than younger workers (even after 
controlling for tenure on the previous job) because they 
have a harder time finding a new good job that requires 
high investments. Yet, there should be no systematic 
difference in wage loss by age for occupations that 
require little training, and this prediction is supported 
by the data from the Displaced Worker Surveys. 
Finally, limited evidence from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics' Survey of Employer-Provided Training 1995 
and the CPS suggests that industries that train more 
also appear to hire younger workers. 
The findings in this paper suggest the importance of 
human capital accumulation in workers' labor market 
success. Firms' reluctance to hire and invest in older 
workers might result in serious problems for workers 
displaced later in their careers. Some form of 
government subsidies to employer-provided training 
might help alleviate the difficulties faced by the older 
workers in their transition. 
Chapter 2 
Use of Means-Tested Transfer Programs 
by Immigrants, Their Children, and 
Their Children's Children 
(co-written with Kristin Butcher) 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 radically changed the 
welfare system in the United States. While the changes 
brought by this law affect all welfare recipients, 
noncitizens were singled out and their access to 
federally funded programs was especially curtailed. 
We present a brief summary of the changes in the 
welfare rules pertaining to noncitizens and highlight 
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the fact that the new rules lead to especially high 
variability across states for noncitizens. We then use 
the most recent data available prior to these law 
changes (1994-1996 CUlTent Population Surveys) to 
examine immigrants' participation in a wide range of 
transfer programs, providing a baseline against which 
to compare immigrants' post-reform participation. 
Next, we examine the participation in transfer programs 
of the native-born children of immigrants (the second 
generation). We combine information from the 1990s 
on the second generation with information on 
immigrants in the 1970s to analyze intergenerational 
cOlTelation in welfare use for immigrants and their 
children. 
We find that immigrants in the 1990s are more likely 
to participate in transfer programs than are the native-
born, particularly for in-kind programs such as food 
stamps and Medicaid. However, immigrants are less 
likely to participate in transfer programs than are the 
native-born with similar characteristics. The second 
generation is less likely than any other group to use 
such programs, on average and controlling for 
characteristics. Finally, we find that initial differences 
in welfare receipt between immigrants and the native-
born are likely to die out after three generations. Once 
the education levels of the second generation are 
controlled for, there is no cOlTelation between the 
welfare receipt of the first and second generations, 
suggesting that welfare receipt does not lead to welfare 
dependency across immigrant generations. 
In sum, there is little evidence that immigrants 
behavior under the pre-reform welfare system was 
different from that of the native-born with similar 
characteristics. Thus, limiting immigrants' access to 
welfare programs must be justified as a cost-saving 
measure, rather than because immigrants respond 
differently to the incentives inherent in transfer 
programs. 
Chapter 3 
Estimating a Censored Dynamic 
Panel Data Model with an 
Application to Earnings Dynamics 
There is a large literature on the black/white wage 
differential and its convergence after the 
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antidiscrimination law of 1964. However, less is 
known about the racial difference in earnings stability 
and its change over time. 
Motivated by this situation, this chapter studies 
earnings dynamics using a particular data set, namely, 
the matched data from the CPS and Social Security 
Administration (SSA) earnings records. The 
advantages of the SSA earnings data include that 1) they 
are accurate (less subject to measurement elTor) and 2) 
they cover a very long history of earnings (1957-1973) 
and are therefore appropriate for studying earnings 
dynamics. However, the SSA earnings data also have 
one significant shortcoming: the records were severely 
top-coded at the maximum Social Security taxable level 
and the tax ceiling was changing over time. To deal 
with this problem, an econometric method is proposed 
to estimate a censored panel data model with a lagged 
latent dependent variable and individual-specific fixed 
effects. Valid asymptotic confidence intervals for the 
AR(1) parameter in the earnings process are 
constructed. The main empirical finding is tht although 
linear GMM estimation yields no difference in earnings 
dynamics by race, the earnings process for white men 
appears to be more persistent than that for black men 
(conditional on individual heterogeneity) after 
censoring is taken into account. 
In future work, I plan to expand the empirical 
analyses to examine changes in the black/white 
earnings stability after the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The 
results should help us to a fuller understanding of the 
effect of the law on the black economic progress during 
the 1960s. 
Chapter 4 
Estimation of Cross-Sectional and Panel Data 
Censored Regression Models with Endogeneity 
(co-written with Eo Honore) 
This chapter is an extension of the econometric 
theory considered in Chapter 3. It proposes methods to 
estimate panel data censored regressgion models with 
general predetermined variables rather than a lagged 
dependent variable, which was considered in Chapter 3. 
The insight behind the estimation methods can also be 
applied to cross-sectional censored regression models 
with endogenous explanatory variables. 
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